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Since the 1980s, telecommunications markets in developing countries have been
undergoing dramatic reforms.  Spurred by changes in technology, the abysmal performance of
incumbent  providers, and prodding by The World Bank and other international organizations,
developing countries are privatizing state-owned telecom providers, openir.g up portions of their
telecom markets to competition, and building regulatory institutions.  We have a good theoretical
understanding of the potential effects of privatization and competition and of the importance of
regulation when privatizing a monopoly provider.I Our empirical knowledge of their effects in
developing countries is much less comprehensive. As Noll (1998) notes, "The main hole in our
knowledge about neoliberal reform of telephone service in developing countries is empirical
knowledge....  As in much of applied microeconomics, the theory to fact ratio is far too high...
."  Indeed, the empirical work to date consists largely of case studies and non-econometric
comparisons of telecom performance before and after privatization. 2 These studies have
provided important insights into reform efforts, but we have no econometric tests of the effects
of competition, privatization, or regulatory changes. This gap exists largely because reforms in
developing countries have occurred relatively recently, meaning that only now is enough data
available to begin econometric analysis.
This paper takes a first step at econometric analysis of the effects of reforms.  Using an
original panel dataset covering 30 countries in Africa and Latin America from 1984 through
1997, the paper explores the effects on telecommunications perfornance  of privatization,
competition (as measured by the number of mobile operators in the country not owned by the
incumbent), and regulation.  I find competition significantly associated with increases in the per
capita number of telephone mainlines, nurnber of payphones, connection capacity, and with
decreases in the price of a local call.  Privatization by itself is significantly associated with
decreased mainline penetration and connection capacity, and positively correlated only with
payphones. Privatization combined with the existence of a separate regulator, however, is
significantly associated with increases in connection capacity and labor efficiency (as measured
by employees per mainline), and substantially mitigates the negative correlation with mainlines.
'  See, for example, Laffont, et al  (1997), The Economic Report of the President (1996), Wellenius (1992), Noll
(1987).
2  See Wellenius, et al (1992) for interesting and informative case studies, and Petrazzini (1996) and Megginson
(1994) for statistical before-after comparisons.
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effective agent of change, privatization without regulation may not improve service, and
regulation is especially important when privatizing a monopoly incumbent. One important
policy implication of these results is that granting exclusivity periods to an incumbent may
seriously delay the real benefits that seem to come with competition.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 briefly discusses the impetus for
telecommunication reforms in developing countries, typical components of reform, and the
existing empirical literature analyzing the effects of reforms.  Section 3 presents the data used in
the paper.  Section 4 discusses the methodology, and section 5 the results.  Section 6 concludes
with a discussion.
2.  Telecommunication reforms
Impetus  for reform
Most developing countries nationalized telecommunications services in the 1  960s.  By
the late 1  980s, however, these countries began to reform their telecom sectors in response to
three interrelated factors: the abysmal performance of state-owned telecom providers, changes in
technology making less tenable the argument that telecommunications are a natural monopoly,
and pressure by The World Bank and other international organizations.
By the 1980s it was clear that nationalized monopoly telecommunications firms in
developing countries could not effectively provide telecom services.  Wellenius, et al (1992) note
that "these state telecommunications monopolies ...  generally fell short of meeting needs, as
evidenced by persistent large unmet demand for telephone connections, call traffic congestion,
poor service quality and reliability, limited territorial coverage, demonstrated willingness of
users to pay far higher prices to obtain service, the virtual absence of modern business services,
and user pressures to bypass the system by building their own facilities."  In 1981 Africa boasted
an average of only 0.8 telephones per hundred people, and Latin America only 5.5, compared to
83.7 in the United States (Saunders, et al 1983). As Noll (1998) points out, "In any nation in
which the political structure makes the government even slightly responsive to the interests of its
citizens, part of the motivation for policy reform is simply poor performance."
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nineteenth century (Petrazzini 1996). Nonetheless, most countries soon embraced the notion that
telecom service was a natural monopoly-that  it could be provided at the lowest cost by one
firm. Noll (1998) notes that "this belief probably never was accurate, but technology has made it
increasingly unlikely."  Smith (1997) observes that "telecommunications is now clearly a
multiproduct sector with several alternative service delivery mechanisms that permit competition
in service provision."  Advances in wireless technology alone make it feasible for competing
firms to roll out telecommunications services with relatively low sunk costs.
The World Bank has been involved in telecommunications since the 1960s. "Initially,
the Bank focused on financing investments to modernize and expand physical plant....  In the
1  970s, broader efforts were made to strengthen the telecommunications enterprises' organization
and management.  In the mid-1980s the Bank further expanded the scope of its support for
telecommunications, emphasizing sectoral reforms including, where appropriate, the
privatization of state telecommunications enterprises" (Wellenius, et al 1992). The increased
emphasis on private sector development and on promoting competition by aid agencies as
conditions for, and uses of, foreign aid has affected the pace of reform efforts.
Reforms, predictions, and existing evidence
Advisers typically recommend three components of telecommunication reform
initiatives: privatizing the state-owned monopoly provider, introducing competition, and creating
an independent regulatory administration. This description is a gross oversimplification, of
course. Each component can be implemented in a variety of ways and to greater or lesser
extents. For example, privatization is rarely complete. The government often retains some
ownership of the incumbent, at least initially.  Competition may be intentionally constrained.
The newly-privatized firm may be given an exclusivity period, in which competition (at least in
wireline service) is prohibited for a number of years in order to entice investors.  Finally,
regulation can take many forms, and its details can have large impacts on sector performance and
the ability of the incumbent to exercise market power.
In general, there is broad agreement that competition is likely to be the most effective
method of promoting improvements in the telecom sector.  Wellenius (1992) observes that "A
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meet equally well the large, varied, and rapidly changing demands of all types of users.
Competition, or a credible threat of competition, is likely to spur established operating
enterprises to focus attention on customers, improve service, accelerate network expansion,
reduce costs, and lower prices."  Most agree, also, that while privatization can bring about great
improvements, it must be combined with effective regulation. Ambrose, et al (1990) note that
"simply moving a monopoly from the public to the private sphere will not result in competitive
behavior." Indeed, "private investors, wary of highly politicized processes, have long demanded
independent regulators who are removed from government influence. More recently, foreign
investors and domestic telecom workers have expressed the same desire" (Petrazzini 1996).
The existing literature contains essentially two types of analyses of reform efforts: case
studies and empirical work that compares average performance indicators across firms or
countries before and after reforms took effect. Not surprisingly, given the region's relatively
early start in reforms, most of this evidence is from Latin America.  In general, these studies find
positive effects of reforms.  On the effects of privatization, Wellenius, et al (1992) conclude from
their case studies that
initial results from privatizing  state telecommunications  enterprises  are generally  very
encouraging.  Governments  have  successfully  sold to consortia  led by experienced  foreign
operating  companies  capable  of providing  expert  managers,  specialized  management  tools,
and continued  access  to latest  technologies. Good financial  performance,  reflecting  both
major tariff adjustmnents  and lower costs, is allowing  privatized  companies  to initially
fmance accelerated investments largely from  internally generated fimds.  Also,
international  markets  have been increasingly  willing to provide large amounts of capital
for  privatized companies in  countries with sound macroeconomic and  regulatory
frameworks  (e.g.,  Chile,  Mexico,  Argentina).
Megginson, et al (1994) compare pre- and post-privatization financial and operating performance
of 61 companies (in 32 industries, including telecommunications) from 18 countries.  They find
that "after being privatized, firms increase real sales, become more profitable, increase their
capital spending, improve their operating efficiency, and increase their work forces."
Petrazzini and Clark (1996) study the effects of competition in Latin America and Asia.
Using the existence of cellular firms as evidence of competition, they compare the performance
of competitive and noncompetitive markets.  They find that cellular and mainline penetration in
competitive markets is higher than in noncompetitive markets.
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note that "the single most troubling issue in recent reforms is slow progress in developing
regulatory capabilities....  Whereas some developing countries have carried out satisfactory
privatization in little over one year, the telecommunications regulatory systems are only in their
infancy." Galal, et al (1995) adopt a hybrid approach to study the effects of regulatory reforms.
They compared the performance of the telecom sector in several countries before and after
regulatory reforms.  They attempt to explore how well countries were able to balance regulatory
objectives: commitment, information asymmetry, and pricing issues.  They find that the one
country in their sample (Chile) that resolved all three issues achieved the greatest improvement,
while the one country (the Philippines) that did not experienced the worst performance.
Countries that resolved some issues experienced mixed success.
The existing literature has given us important information on which aspects of telecom
reforms seem to succeed and which are more problematic. But this work needs to be
complemented by econometric studies that can more rigorously explore the effects of telecom
reform. The existing literature cannot, for example, control for other factors that may affect
telecom performance. Boubraki and Cosset (1998), in a study of 79 firms (in several industries)
in 21 developing countries find significant productivity improvements after privatization.  But
they also note that "it appears that privatization yields greater benefits for companies
headquartered in countries with higher per capita income."  This comment highlights the need
for econometric analysis-in  this case to control for income.  While it may be the case that
privatization is most successful in wealthier countries, it may also be the case that firms in
general in wealthier countries experienced improved productivity during the few years studied.
The point here is that it is important to conduct econometric analyses to complement existing
work and to begin to address such lingering issues. Enough time has elapsed from the start of
reforms to make such analyses possible.
In the remainder of the paper I explore empirically the effects of privatization,
competition, and regulatory changes on telecommunications performance.  In the following
sections I describe the data, methodology, and econometric results.
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The dataset contains information on 30 countries in Africa and Latin America from 1984
- 1997  (Table 1 lists the countries). An observation, therefore, is a country-year.  Not all data
exist for all countries. Nonetheless, the data allow us to begin exploring empirically the effects
of liberalization.  Specifically, using this unbalanced panel we can investigate the relationships
between competition, privatization, having an independent regulatory agency, and
telecommunication performance measures.
Primary telecommunication indicators include the number of main lines, the number of
payphones, network connection capacity, telecom employees per main line, and price of a three-
minute local call.  These statistics come from the International Telecommunications Union
(ITU). Table 2 shows trends in these indicators by region (calculated from the countries in the
sample).
Main line penetration (main lines per capita, or teledensity) is the most common indicator
of telecom performance as it is the variable most commonly reported to the ITU. A main line "is
a telephone line connecting the subscriber's terminal equipment to the public switched network
and which has a dedicated port in the telephone exchange equipment" (ITU, 1998c). This
variable provides an indication of the level of penetration of telephone service in the country. In
some ways the number of mainlines per capita overstates access to phones, and in other ways
understates it. It may overstate access since some people have several lines-a  line at home, as
well as two or more at work for phone and fax.  It may understate access since some lines will be
for public phones or call centers where many people use one line.  Nonetheless, it remains the
best available indicator of telephone penetration.
The number of payphones per capita provides some measure of the extent of universal
service. While this number does not tell us what percentage of the poor or rural population
actually has access to a phone, a payphone is, in theory, useful to anyone who lives relatively
nearby. Access to a payphone is probably a better indicator of universal service for very
impoverished countries than is the percentage of people with telephones in the home. 3
3  A good indicator of universal service may be the percentage of the population within walking distance of a public
phone.
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connected. This number includes, therefore, main lines already connected and main lines
available for future connection, including those used for technical operation of the exchange (test
numbers). The measure should be the actual capacity of the system rather than the theoretical
potential when the system is upgraded or compression technology is employed" (ITU 1  998c).
The number of employees per main line provides a measure of labor efficiency. It is not
clear what a beneficial effect of reforms would be on this indicator. While we expect
privatization and competition to lead to greater efficiency, beneficial reforms could have two,
opposite, impacts on this indicator. First, it may induce the incumbent firm to eliminate excess
staff (leading to a reduction in staff per main line). Second, it may cause firms to increase
employment as they hire staff in order to increase capacity.  Thus, the expected results of reforms
on this indicator are indeterminate.
The price of a three-minute call is the price "of a peak rate 3-minute call within the same
exchange area using the subscriber's own terminal (i.e., not from a public telephone)" (ITU
1998c). Tariff data is the least commonly reported-and  least reliable-of  these indicators.
Again, it is unclear what a beneficial effect of reforms would be on prices.  On one hand,
competition should work to reduce prices.  On the other hand, residential prices are often
subsidized. Reforms often include efforts to end cross-subsidies, which could lead to an increase
in consumer prices.
This analysis attempts to explore the effects of privatization, competition, and regulation
on telecom services, using the variables above to measure service. This reform information
comes from ITU publications, Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) publications, and the U.S.
Federal Communications Commission. Privatization is a dummy variable that equals one
beginning the year the firm was privatized, if ever. This variable does not capture the extent of
privatization; it simply indicates whether the government sold even part of the firm.
Competition is measured by the number of wireless operators in the country not owned by the
incumbent. This is not a perfect measure of competition. For example, cellular service is
effectively available only to the wealthy in very poor countries. The most inexpensive cellular
plan offered by Telcell (one of three mobile operators) in Ghana, for example, is $25 per month,
plus $0.50 per minute after the first ten minutes (Telcell 1999). Even if the user pays only the
base charge his bill is $300 per year-quite  steep in a country with an average per capita income
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and are potential threats to t-he  incumbent since they can increase penetration swiftly at relatively
low cost per additional subscriber.  In this capacity they could spur the incumbent to improve its
services.
The regulatory measure is a dummy variable indicating whether the country has a
separate telecommunications regulatory agency not directly under the control of a ministry. This
information comes from ITU publications. Having a separate regulator is generally associated
with attempts at regulatory reform, and its effect in a regression analysis is probably better
characterized as indicating a country's propensity to undertake regulatory reforms rather than the
effect of a separate regulator, per se.
Control variables include per capita income, population, percent of the population living
in an urban area, a dummy variable indicating whether the country passed telecom reform
legislation, a dummy variable indicating whether a World Bank telecommunications project was
active in the country-year, net World Bank aid as a percent of GDP, exports as a share of GDP,
and a variable measuring the risk of expropriation. The macroeconomic and demographic
variables come from The World Bank's Statistical Information and Management Analysis
(SIMA) database. The risk variable comes from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG),
and is 10 point scale where 10 indicates the lowest risk of expropriation. 4
4.  Methodology
I use these data to explore the effects of telecom reforms on telecommunication
performance. Because countries differ in so many ways I employ a fixed-effects model to
control for unobserved country-specific factors. I also include year dummies to control for time
trends.  I first estimate equation (1) to get a first look at the effects of competition, privatization,
and regulation.
(1)  yi,  = a,  +y,  + 31  (cell, ) + 03 2(private,,) +  (Reg,)  +0(X,,)  +
4  The ICRG variable goes only through 1995. Because this variable exhibits little variation over time, I assume
that it remains the same from 1995 through 1997. This assumption clearly adds error and may slightly  bias
coefficients on this variable when used in a regression.
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indicators discussed above. The five different definitions of the dependent variable, Yit, are:
number of mainlines per capita, number of payphones per capita, network connection capacity
per capita, employees per mainline, and the cost of a three-minute call.  Celli, is the number of
mobile operators not owned by the incumbent and private,, is a dummy variable indicating
whether the incumbent is privatized. Regi, is the dummy variable measuring whether there exists
a separate regulator. Xi, is a vector of control variables described above.
The regulatory dummy variable does not come close to capturing the many aspects of
regulation that can affect telecom performance. This simple variable, however, can provide us
with information beyond that derived from estimating equation (1).  Theory suggests that simply
privatizing a monopoly may not generate telecom improvements.  Careful regulation is required
to encourage a monopoly to improve its performance. To explore further the effects of
regulation I interact the regulation dummy with the privatization dummy and with the number of
competitors, and estimate equation (2).
(2) Ye,  = ai + Y,  + p,  (cellj) + 12(private,)  + P3  (cell,,  * regI,)  + P4  (private, * regi,)  +
o (Regj,  + 0 (Xi,)  +  i,,
Equation (2) allows us to explore separately the effects of competition, privatization,
regulation, and how they interact. That is, how do competition and regulation together, and
privatization and regulation together correlate with telecommunication sector performance? This
is an especially important question given that theory suggests, and most policy makers and
advisers agree, that reforms must give careful thought to regulation when privatizing the
monopoly provider.
5.  Results
This section presents the results of estimating equations (1) and (2) above. The section is
organized by telecom indicator. For each indicator I first discuss the results of equation (1) and
then of equation (2). The final subsection is an overview and summary of the results.  To
preview, the results are, in general, consistent with conventional wisdom.  Competition is
associated with increased mainline penetration, payphones, connection capacity, and lower
prices for local calls. Privatization by itself, meanwhile, is significantly associated with an
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with decreases in mainline penetration and connection capacity. Privatization combined with the
presence of a separate regulator, however, is associated with increased payphone penetration,
connection capacity and increased labor efficiency as measured by employees per main line.
Regulation interacted with competition had no significant impact.
Number of mainlines
Table 3 shows the results of estimations using number of mainlines as the dependent
variables. Column (1) shows results of equation (1). The number of competitors is positively
correlated with main lines.  Indeed, this regression suggests that, ceteris parib us, each mobile
competitor is associated with an increase of almost 0.2 additional main lines per hundred
population.  Privatization turns out to be significantly correlated with a decrease of almost 0.7
main lines per hundred population.  Column (2) of Table 3 shows the results of estimating
equation (2).  The number of competitors remains positive and significant.  The regulation
dummy is insignificant, as is the competition-regulation  interaction coefficient.
The story is different for privatization, however. In column (2) the coefficient on
privatization is negative and significant, while the coefficient on privatization interacted with
regulation is positive and significant. These results suggest that privatizing the incumbent with
no changes in regulatory laws is correlated with a decrease of 1.5 main lines per hundred
population. Establishing a separate regulator along with privatizing the incumbent mitigates this
effect, however. The coefficient on the interaction term suggests that the combination effect is
correlated with a net decrease of about 0.2 lines per hundred population.
As expected, income per capita is strongly positively correlated with main lines per
capita. Population and the percentage of population that lives in an urban area are negatively
correlated with main lines per capita. Aid-both  as a percentage of GDP and the presence of a
World Bank telecom project-are  insignificant. Exports as a share of GDP is weakly positive,
and lower expropriation risk is positively correlated with mainlines per capita.
The variable indicating the passage of reform legislation is negative and significant. The
most likely explanation for this result is reverse causality-poor  performance helps stimulate
reform efforts.  Legislation, of course, is necessary before competition and privatization can be
Page 10pursued.  As the EIU (1997) notes, telecom reform "often requires changes in
telecommunications laws or national constitutions, and is subject to legislative and political
delays. Once the formal regulatory structures have been implemented, additional time and
experience is needed to develop policymakers who understand how new technologies and
services impact their markets."
Payphones
Table 4 shows the results of equations (1) and (2) using the number of payphones per
million as the dependent variable. Column (1) shows results with no interaction terms.  As with
number of main lines, competition is significantly and positively correlated with additional
payphones. Each mobile competitor is associated with almost 54 additional payphones per
million population.  Privatization is correlated with approximately 264 additional payphones per
million.  Column (2) shows the results when interaction terms are included.  Again, competition
is positive and significant. Competition interacted with regulation is not significant.
Privatization is negative and significant. Privatization interacted with regulation, however, is
positive and significant and of a relatively large magnitude.  Regulation alone is significantly
negative. These results suggest that privatizing the incumbent combined with the existence of a
separate regulator are correlated with a net increase of almost 650 payphones per million
population.  Privatization without a separate regulator, in column (2), is associated with a
decrease of almost 220 payphones per million population.  The first mobile competitor is
correlated with a net decrease of just over 40 payphones per million, but each additional mobile
operator is associated with an increase of 98 per million.
Other results are similar in sign to Table 3 (although often not significant), with a few
exceptions. Income per capita and the passage of reform legislation have the same effects as in
table 3.  Population, however, is positively correlated with the number of payphones per capita.
The other controls are not statistically significant.
Connection capacity
Page 1  1Table 5 shows the results of equations (1) and (2) using connection capacity as the
dependent variable.  These results are almost identical to those using mainline penetration. This
is not surprising since the number of mainlines is largely determined by connection capacity.
Column (I) shows results with no interaction terms.  Again, competition is significantly
correlated with increased capacity and privatization with decreased capacity.  Column (2) shows
results when including interaction terms. Competition is positive and significant, while
competition interacted with regulation is insignificant. The regulation variable alone, however,
is negative and significant. Privatization alone is negative and significant, while privatization
interacted with regulation is correlated with a small positive number.
Labor efficiency-number  of employees  per main line
Table 6 shows the results of equations (1) and (2) using the number of employees per
mainline as the dependent variable. Column (1) shows results with no interaction terms. The
number of mobile competitors is positively correlated with number of employees per main line.
Each mobile competitor is associated with 0.1 additional employee per hundred mainlines. The
coefficient on privatization is insignificant. Competition remains positive and significant when
including the interaction terms, although competition interacted with regulation is not significant.
The coefficient on privatization interacted with regulation, however, becomes negative and
marginally significant.
These results suggest that competition is correlated with an increase in employment per
line while privatization along with a separate regulator is correlated with a decrease. An
explanation consistent with theory is that competition brings about much new investment, which
requires additional workers. A privatized firm subject to price regulation, meanwhile, may face
incentives to cut costs, leading it to reduce a bloated workforce.
Income per capita is negatively correlated with employees per main line. This is
consistent with casual observation-firms  in higher income countries operate more efficiently.
The coefficient on World Bank aid as a percent of GDP is also negative and significant. This
may reflect the World Bank's focus on plans to make state-owned enterprises more efficient
(often through privatization) as conditions for granting loans.
Page 12Price of local calls
Price data are the least commonly-reported and among the least reliable of telecom
indicators. Even if the price reported is accurate, it is not necessarily easily comparable across
countries. The size of a local exchange area may differ dramatically. Prices may be set by the
government and bear little relation to costs. The are also often subject to extensive cross-
subsidies. Nonetheless, it proves interesting to explore how competition, privatization, and
regulation affect this price variable. Table 7 shows results of estimating equations (1) and (2)
using the price of a three-minute local call as the dependent variable.  Note that the sample size
in these regressions is relatively small, so the results should be taken with a grain of salt even
larger than with the results discussed above.
Competition is negatively correlated with the price of a local call.  Each competitor is
correlated with a price reduction of about $US 0.01.  Privatization is not significantly correlated
with prices. The story with the interaction terms is the same. Competition is correlated with the
same price reduction, and privatization (by itself and interacted with regulation) is not correlated
with price.  This result is somewhat surprising. Although competition typically brings about
price reductions for normal goods, residential phone service is often subsidized. Telecom
reforms often include efforts to eliminate or reduce cross-subsidies. In those circumstances we
would expect an increase in prices.  Instead, we see a decrease in prices.
6.  Discussion/Future issues
The empirical results presented here are largely consistent with conventional wisdom.
Competition appears to have tangible benefits across the board-on  mainline penetration,
payphones, connection capacity, and prices. Privatization by itself does not appear to generate
many benefits, and is negatively correlated with main line penetration.  Privatization combined a
separate regulator, however, is correlated with increased connection capacity and payphones per
capita. Moreover, this interaction mitigates the negative effects of privatization on mainline
penetration. These results suggest that reformers are correct to emphasize regulatory reforms
along with privatization, since privatization without attention to regulation may be costly to
consumers. Because competition appears to be the most successful agent of change, reformers
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telecom providers.  While temporary monopoly rights undoubtedly raise the value of the
incumbent to potential investors, it may delay the arrival of improved services to consumers.
These results are interesting and encouraging, since they suggest that reform efforts are,
in general, on the right track.  But these results are far from conclusive.  A large number of issues
remain to be addressed.  A first order of business is to gather more detailed regulatory data.
Noting that a country is not ignoring the regulation issue-indicated  by establishing a separate
regulator-is  a start, but does not begin to uncover the possible permutations of regulation. It
would be useful to know not only what type of regulation the country adopts (price caps versus
cost-of-service, for example), but also details on the regulatory agency itself.  What is its annual
budget?  How many employees does it have?  Where do the regulators come from?  What sort of
training and experience do they have?  What enforcement powers does the regulatory authority
have?
Second, we should conduct firm-level analyses similar to the ones presented here.
Country-level data, while interesting, simply loses too much detail in the aggregation.
Moreover, country-level analysis relies on telecom indicators from the ITU.  While these are the
best country-level data available, they do not always capture all telecom activity in the country.
Often they contain information on only the incumbent. Firm-level data would give us a much
more detailed and accurate view of the effects of privatization, competition, and regulation and
the overall telecom market in the country.
Finally, competition, privatization, and regulation must be endogenized in these analyses.
In this paper I have implicitly assumed that they are exogenous to telecom performance, but this
assumption is almost certainly not be true. The same factors influencing changes in telecom
performance may also influence reforms.  Alternatively, performance can influence reforms
rather than vice-versa.  The finding that privatization is negatively correlated with the number of
main lines, for example, could arise because countries are more likely to privatize their
incumbent telecom provider when service is poor or because privatization without regulation can
harm consumers. Endogenizing privatization would allow us to separately test these hypotheses.
In addition, while poor performance can stimulate reforms, it could also be true that improved
performance can stimulate additional reforms, which then have further impacts.  A country may
reluctantly allow a private firm to offer cellular service and, upon witnessing quick performance
Page 14improvements, decide to grant further concessions and otherwise liberalize its telecom sector.
Empirical analyses should take factors like this into account.
This paper has used an original dataset of 30 countries from 1984 through 1997 to
explore the effects of privatization, competition, and regulation on telecom sector performance.
Using a fixed effects model, I find that competition in the form of mobile operators not owned by
the incumbent are correlated with increases in mainline penetration, the number of payphones
per capita, and connection capacity per capita, and with decreases in the price of local calls.
Privatization by itself does not appear to generate benefits and is negatively correlated with
mainline penetration. Privatization combined with the existence of a separate regulator (which
indicates that reforms are at least minimally addressing the issue of regulation), however, is
correlated with increases in mainlines, payphones, and connection capacity, and decreases in the
price of local calls.
The results suggest that reform efforts tend to be concentrated in the right areas:
encouraging competition and emphasizing building regulatory capacity when privatizing an
incumbent telecom provider. The benefits associated with competition over privatization,
however, should cause policy makers to think carefully when granting exclusivity periods to
privatized incumbents and, at the very least, should pay careful attention to the regulatory
authority.  This paper represents the first attempt at econometric analysis of telecom reform
efforts in developing countries. This work is merely a first cut at empirical tests, however. As
more data become available for conducting econometric tests, we should gain greater insights.
Future work should concentrate on improving data on regulation, gathering firm-level data, and
endogenizing reform efforts such as competition, privatization, and regulation.
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Page 17Table 1
Countries in Telecommunications Database
Africa  Latin America
Botswana  Argentina
Cameroon  Brazil
Cote d'Ivoire  Bolivia
Ghana  Chile
Kenya  Costa Rica
Malawi  Colombia











Telecom Statistics  for Latin American and Africa  (excluding South Africa)
Mainlines  Payphones  Connection capacity  Employees per line  Price of 3-min local call
Year  per hundred population  per hundred population  per hundred population
Latin  America  Africa  Latin  America  Africa  Latin  America  Africa  Latin  America  Africa  Latin  America  Africa
1984  4.56  0.74  0.06  n/a  5.83  1.16  0.03  0.08  n/a  n/a
1985  4.95  0.82  0.06  0.01  5.77  1.11  0.03  0.07  n/a  n/a
1986  5.22  0.88  0.07  0.01  5.92  1.46  0.02  0.07  0.03  0.16
1987  5.54  0.94  0.08  0.01  6.85  1.48  0.02  0.07  0.05  0.11
1988  5.86  1.00  0.09  0.01  7.61  1.29  0.02  0.07  0.06  0.11
1989  6.16  1.08  0.09  0.01  7.16  1.58  0.02  0.06  0.06  0.09
1990  6.66  1.17  0.09  0.01  8.23  1.55  0.02  0.06  0.05  0.07
1991  7.14  1.30  0.09  0.01  8.54  1.86  0.02  0.05  0.05  0.06
1992  7.77  1.48  0.10  0.01  9.17  1.97  0.02  0.05  0.04  0.09
1993  8.50  1.72  0.11  0.01  10.07  2.26  0.02  0.05  0.05  0.09
1994  9.19  1.95  0.12  0.01  10.78  2.40  0.01  0.04  0.05  0.07
1995  9.91  2.15  0.14  0.02  12.47  2.66  0.01  0.04  0.05  0.08
1996  10.86  2.45  0.15  0.03  13.49  3.36  0.01  0.04  0.07  0.09




Dependent variable  Mainlines per hundred population
Mean of dependent variable  4.45
Column 1  Column 2
Coefficieni t-statistic  Coefficieni  t-statistic
# mobile operators  0.18  2.81  0.25  2.71
Incumbent privatized?  -0.69  -2.32  -1.45  -3.21
privatized*separate regulator  1.24  2.30
# mobile firms * separate regulator  -0.08  -0.62
Separate regulator  0.23  0.99  0.03  0.10
Reform legislation passed  -1.06  -5.35  -0.97  -4.84
Population  -0.10  -4.60  -0.10  -4.57
Percent population urban  -0.08  -3.23  -0.08  -3.13
Income per capita  0.0013  13.57  0.0014  13.85
World Bank telecom project  0.20  1.23  0.23  1.37
World Bank aid / GDP  -0.27  -0.10  0.23  0.08
Exports / GDP  1.56  1.64  1.72  1.81
Expropriation risk  0.21  3.00  0.20  2.87
R-squared  0.96  0.96




Dependent variable  Payphones per million population
Mean of dependent variable  816.3
Column 1  Column 2
Coefficieni t-statistic  Coefficieni t-statistic
#  mobile operators  53.55  2.98  98.10  4.28
Incumbent privatized?  264.26  3.01  -219.96  -1.95
privatized*separate regulator  867.69  6.39
# mobile firms * separate regulator  -47.12  -1.56
Separate regulator  55.92  0.81  -141.16  -1.81
Reform legislation passed  -100.88  -1.73  -17.94  -0.33
Population  53.04  7.35  51.32  7.73
Percent population urban  -2.22  -0.23  0.96  0.11
Income per capita  0.09  3.02  0.11  4.08
World Bank telecom project  -48.21  -0.81  -24.24  -0.43
World Bank aid / GDP  1718.24  0.90  2394.74  1.37
Exports / GDP  203.00  0.63  238.63  0.80
Expropriation risk  -17.33  -0.66  -12.37  -0.51
R-squared  0.92  0.94
Number observations  285  285TABLE  S
Effect  on connection  capacity
Fixed  Effects  estimation
Dependent  variable  connection  capacity  per hundred  population
Mean  of dependent  variable  5.29857
Column  1  Column  2
Coefficieni t-statistic  Coefficieni t-statistic
# mobile  operators  0.26  3.23  0.23  2.19
Incumbent  privatized?  -0.72  -1.93  -1.48  -2.80
privatized*separate  regulator  1.57  2.41
# mobile  firms  * separate  regulator  0.20  1.23
Separate  regulator  0.47  1.63  -0.12  -0.36
Reform  legislation  passed  -0.83  -3.34  -0.71  -2.86
Population  -0.12  -4.03  -0.10  -3.69
Percent  population  urban  -0.08  -2.46  -0.08  -2.42
Income  per capita  0.00  12.55  0.00  13.09
World  Bank  telecom  project  -0.03  -0.14  0.04  0.18
World  Bank aid  / GDP  2.72  0.80  4.24  1.26
Exports  / GDP  1.04  0.91  1.41  1.25
Expropriation  risk  0.08  0.87  0.06  0.62
R-squared  0.96  0.97
Number  observations  348  348
TABLE 6
Effect  on employees  per  mainline
Fixed  Effects  estimation
Dependent  variable  employees  per hundred  main  lines
Mean  of dependent  variable  1.5115
Column  I  CQlumn  2
Coefficieni  t-statistic  Coefficieni  t-statistic
# mobile  operators  0.09  3.36  0.09  2.42
Incumbent  privatized?  -0.06  -0.51  0.15  0.80
privatized*separate  regulator  -0.35  -1.62
# mobile  firms * separate  regulator  -0.02  -0.40
Separate  regulator  -0.02  -0.18  0.09  0.85
Reform  legislation  passed  -0.17  -2.07  -0.21  -2.50
Population  -0.02  -2.39  -0.02  -2.36
Percent  population  urban  0.04  3.97  0.04  3.92
Income  per capita  0.00  -7.29  0.00  -7.55
World  Bank  telecom  project  -0.05  -0.72  -0.07  -1.00
World  Bank aid  / GDP  -1.80  -1.63  -2.09  -1.88
Exports  / GDP  0.66  1.69  0.63  1.61
Expropriation  risk  0.05  1.73  0.05  1.80
R-squared  0.98  0.98
Number  observations  394  394TABLE  7
Effect on the price of a local call
Fixed Effects estimation
Dependent  variable  price  of a 3-minute  local call
Mean  of dependent  variable  0.072
Column  I  Column  2
Coefficieni t-statistic  Coefficieni t-statistic
# mobile  operators  -0.0090  -2.58  -0.0095  -2.00
Incumbent  privatized?  -0.0192  -0.89  -0.0075  -0.27
privatized*separate  regulator  -0.0200  -0.75
# mobile  firms * separate  regulator  0.0000  0.01
Separate  regulator  0.0130  1.14  0.0184  1.37
Reform  legislation  passed  0.0083  0.76  0.0044  0.36
Population  0.0054  1.99  0.0055  2.01
Percent  population  urban  -0.0040  -1.77  -0.0042  -1.83
Income  per capita  0.0000  1.05  0.0000  1.12
World Bank  telecom  project  0.0298  2.23  0.0281  2.03
World Bank  aid / GDP  -0.0193  -0.06  -0.0692  -0.21
Exports  / GDP  -0.1655  -1.90  -0.1599  -1.82
Expropriation  risk  0.0054  0.96  0.0056  1.00
R-squared  0.76  0.76
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